





Recent work on blameworthiness has prominently featured discussions of guilt. The 
philosophers who develop guilt-based views of blameworthiness do an excellent job of 
attending to the evaluative and affective features of feeling guilty. However, these philosophers 
have been less attentive to guilt’s characteristic action tendencies and the role admissions of 
guilt play in our blaming practices. This paper focuses on the nature of guilty confession and 
argues that it illuminates an important function of blame that has been overlooked in the recent 
work on guilt as it relates to blameworthiness: Blame can communicate respect.  
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1. Introduction  
In discussions of the relationship between the reactive attitudes and blameworthiness, 
resentment has historically taken centre stage. Recently, however, these discussions have 
prominently featured another reactive attitude: guilt. For example, Randolph Clarke, in a pair 
of recent papers (2013; 2016), presents the minimal desert thesis, according to which a 
blameworthy agent deserves to feel guilty “to the right extent, at the right time, regarding the 
thing for which she is to blame, and deserves this because of her culpability” (2016: 121). And, 
also in a pair of papers (2017; 2019), Andreas Carlsson develops the deserved guilt view of 
blameworthiness: “An agent S is blameworthy (for X), and is an appropriate target of 
resentment and indignation, if and only if S deserves to feel guilt (for X)” (2017: 104). 
Additionally, Douglas Portmore has recently argued that “a subject is accountable for having 
φ-ed if and only if it would be appropriate for her to feel either prideful or guilty for having φ-
ed, depending on whether φ’s valence is positive or negative” (2019: 5).2 
 
1 This title was inspired by a recurring segment with the same name on David Pizarro and Tamler 
Sommers’ podcast Very Bad Wizards, which was itself inspired by the many subreddits dedicated to 
the practice.  
2 In addition to these views of blameworthiness, philosophers have also developed accounts of moral 
responsibility in terms of guilt as well. For example, Austin Duggan defends a guilt-based view of moral 
responsibility, which he takes to be importantly different from blameworthiness, according to which 
“an agent is morally responsible in a liability sense for a transgression just in case she or he deserves to 
feel moral guilt for that transgression” (2018: 307). For the sake of simplicity, I’ll focus only on 
accounts of guilt and blameworthiness in this essay, particularly Carlsson’s.  
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These views are promising, in part, because they are able to capture a particular function 
of blame better than any of the traditional views. If the point of blame is to allocate suffering 
to wrongdoers, then guilt-based accounts of blameworthiness have a clear advantage over their 
competitors.3 This is due to the nature of guilt, and the philosophers who develop guilt-based 
views do an excellent job of attending to the evaluative and affective features of feeling guilty. 
However, these philosophers have been less attentive to guilt’s distinctive action tendencies 
and the role admissions of guilt play in our blaming practices. In this essay, I reflect on the 
nature of guilty confession and argue that it illuminates an important function of blame that has 
been overlooked in the recent work on guilt as it relates to blameworthiness: Blame can 
communicate respect.  
My plan for the paper is as follows. In section 2, I discuss two standard ways of 
conceiving of the relationship between the reactive attitudes and blameworthiness and then I 
present Carlsson’s (2017) criticism of these views. Next, in section 3, I introduce Carlsson’s 
deserved guilt view of blameworthiness. I then explore the practices and conversations that 
surround guilty confessions in section 4. In section 5, I examine how these conversations 
illuminate the ability of blame to communicate respect and argue that if we want our theories 
of blameworthiness to be able to justify the blaming practices that surround guilty confessions, 
we should reject these recent guilt-based accounts. Finally, in section 6 I consider the objection 
that our accounts of blameworthiness should not be required to capture the respect-based 
function of blame.   
2. The reactive attitudes and blameworthiness 
 
3 I’ll neither defend nor deny this particular assumption in this essay, though I do accept that blame 
often leads to the suffering of its targets, whether or not this is its aim and whether or not this is what 
blameworthy agents deserve.  
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Before presenting his own account of blameworthiness as deserved guilt, Carlsson (2017) 
criticises several ways of conceiving of the relationship between blameworthiness and the 
reactive attitudes. The first approach Carlsson discusses is the appropriate emotions view (AE).  
Carlsson uses Peter Graham’s formulation of his view to characterize AE:  
X is blameworthy for ⌽-ing iff the feeling of a blame emotion—resentment, 
indignation, guilt—toward X in response to ⌽-ing would be appropriate. (Graham 
2014: 390) 
 
While this view has been defended by others (e.g., Hieronymi 2004), Carlsson argues that it 
fails what he calls the practicality requirement: “If we know that an agent is blameworthy, we 
should also know that it is pro tanto permissible to express blame” (Carlsson 2017: 95). Blame, 
when expressed, characteristically causes harm to its recipients. And practices that tend to 
cause harm to others are governed by norms of fairness or desert. So, to fulfil the practicality 
requirement, a view needs to tell us when engaging in blame is either fair or deserved. But AE 
analyses blameworthiness in terms of the appropriateness conditions of experiencing the 
blaming emotions. And these appropriateness conditions can’t ground the fairness or desert 
norms that govern expressions of blame. According to Graham and Hieronymi, it is appropriate 
to experience resentment and indignation when the corresponding judgments are correct (or 
justified) or the evaluative content of the emotions is true. But the conditions under which it 
would be appropriate to experience resentment and/or indignation could be the very same 
conditions in which it would be wildly unfair or undeserved to express these emotions. So, AE 
can’t tell us when or why it is permissible to express blame, and thus it fails the practicality 
requirement.  
In contrast, what Carlsson calls the deserved sanction view (DS) is able to meet the 
practicality requirement easily.4 According to DS:  
 
4 Carlsson also discusses the fair sanctions view, according to which blameworthy agents are those who 
it would be fair to sanction with outward expressions of resentment and indignation (2017: 98). Though 
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An agent S is blameworthy (for X) if and only if S deserves to be sanctioned by 
outwardly expressed resentment or indignation (for X). (Carlsson 2017: 99)  
 
Because DS analyses blameworthiness in terms of deserved expressions of resentment and 
indignation, the view can supply the reasons necessary to fulfil the practicality requirement. 
On DS, we have pro tanto reason to express resentment and indignation at blameworthy agents 
because blameworthy agents deserve to be sanctioned in precisely this way.  
 Though DS meets the practicality requirement, Carlsson argues that it is plagued by the 
problem of contingent harm (2017: 99). Some agents simply don’t care what people think of 
them and are impervious to expressions of resentment. Other agents care a great deal and 
experience high levels of distress at the smallest expressions of resentment and indignation. 
Imagine two agents, Sue and Emma, whose psychologies are such that while Sue suffers not at 
all in the face of others’ resentment, Emma suffers an inordinate amount. Suppose further that 
Sue and Emma are equally blameworthy for committing some wrong. On DS, what 
blameworthy agents deserve is the outward expression of resentment and/or indignation. So, 
on this view, Sue and Emma deserve the very same thing—they deserve to be outwardly 
resented to the same degree. And, if Sue and Emma are resented to the same degree then they 
each get what they deserve. This is true even if Sue takes only delight in being the target of 
resentment while Emma is harmed significantly. Carlsson argues that this is counterintuitive—
blameworthy agents don’t simply deserve to be the target of a reactive attitude; they deserve 
the suffering that is imposed by the expressions of these attitudes. But whether expressions of 
resentment or indignation can cause blameworthy agents to suffer is a contingent matter. Thus, 
DS fails to pick out what blameworthy agents actually deserve.    
3. Blameworthiness and deserved guilt 
 
this view meets the practicality requirement, Carlsson dismisses it because the fairness of expressions 
of blame is affected by features beyond the blameworthiness of agents. I’ll explore the relationship 
between blameworthiness and our blaming practices in section 6. 
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DS is susceptible to the problem of contingent harm because expressions of resentment and 
indignation cannot secure the suffering of their targets. But perhaps there is another reactive 
attitude that, if experienced, could guarantee that blameworthy agents suffer, and thus get what 
they deserve. Carlsson thinks there is such a reactive attitude: guilt.   
Like many philosophers who work on the philosophy of emotions, Carlsson, and other 
recent guilt-centric theorists, take guilt to have both an evaluative and affective component. 
Most of these theorists agree that guilt possesses an unpleasant or negative affect: It’s not 
possible to feel guilty without feeling bad. But there is more debate about what the evaluative 
component of guilt involves. Portmore argues that the evaluative component of guilt is “the 
thought that one deserves to feel bad given one’s failure to live up to some legitimate demand” 
(2019: 8–9), while Clarke suggests that it is “the thought that one is blameworthy for 
something” (2016: 123). Carlsson is less committal and considers several possibilities, but 
ultimately settles on the thought that one has “displayed an objectionable quality of will” (2017: 
101).5 Guilt’s unique evaluative and affective features make it an ideal reactive attitude on 
which to build accounts of blameworthiness. According to the guilt-centric theorists, 
blameworthy agents deserve to suffer (to the appropriate degree and for the right reasons). Due 
to guilt’s affective component, a guilty agent will necessarily suffer and, due to its evaluative 
component, this agent will also suffer for the right reasons.  
Given these features of guilt, Carlsson proposes the deserved guilt view (DG):   
An agent S is blameworthy (for X), and is an appropriate target of resentment and 
indignation, if and only if S deserves to feel guilt (for X). (2017: 104) 
 
 
5 While many take the evaluative content of guilt to involve a thought regarding wrongdoing and 
understand the experience of guilt to be self-blame, these claims have not gone uncontested. For 
example, Rachana Kamtekar and Shaun Nichols (2019), along with Michael Zhao (2020), defend 
accounts of guilt that can make sense of experiencing guilt without thinking that one has done something 
wrong or is at fault. And David Shoemaker (forthcoming) has recently argued that self-blame should 
not be understood in terms of guilt, but rather as a form of goal-frustrated anger.   
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The advantages of this view are many. Unlike DS, DG can overcome the problem of contingent 
harm. While being the target of expressions of resentment and indignation does not guarantee 
that an agent suffers, an agent cannot feel guilty without suffering. So, in defining blameworthy 
agents as those who deserve to feel guilty, DG can capture the intuition that blameworthy 
agents deserve to suffer.  
 Furthermore, Carlsson argues that DG, unlike AE, can meet the practicality requirement 
and explain why it is permissible to express blame towards blameworthy agents. While DG 
itself says nothing about the conditions under which it would be fair or deserved to express 
blame, Carlsson argues that DG can indirectly meet the practicality requirement. First, because 
blameworthy agents deserve to feel guilty, on DG, this means that it will be non-instrumentally 
good for blameworthy agents to experience guilt.6 Because we have pro tanto reason to bring 
about states of affairs that are non-instrumentally good, then we have pro tanto reason to 
generate guilt in blameworthy agents.  
In order for this argument to be complete, however, Carlsson needs to defend the claim 
that expressions of blame generate guilt in wrongdoers. After all, if expressions of blame are 
particularly bad at generating guilt, then DG can’t be part of the explanation as to why it’s 
permissible to express blame towards blameworthy agents. Happily, there is a significant 
amount of work, particularly from defenders of communicative accounts of blame, that 
Carlsson could rely on to support his claim. Many of these communicative theorists argue that 
the function of blame is to generate guilt in their targets. For example, Miranda Fricker argues 
that “The illocutionary point of Communicative Blame is…to inspire that admixture of 
judgement and moral emotion that is remorse” (2016: 172–173). Coleen Macnamara also 
 
6 While I’ll grant this move in this essay, Dana Nelkin (2019) provides an extended critique of the 
relationship between the view that blameworthy agents deserve to feel guilty and the view that it is non-
instrumentally good that blameworthy agents feel guilty. Nelkin (2019) also criticises the view that we 
have pro tanto reasons to induce feelings of guilt in blameworthy agents. 
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contends that “Specifically, emotional uptake of the representational content of resentment or 
indignation by the wrongdoer amounts to guilt.” (2015: 559) And even Susan Wolf, who 
presents a robust defence of anger, argues that the point of anger, when its aim is to blame, is 
to get the target of blame “…to experience the painful feelings of guilt and remorse” (2011: 
338). So, by relying on this work on the relationship between expressions of resentment and 
indignation and the experience of guilt, Carlsson can conclude that we have pro tanto reason 
to express resentment and indignation at blameworthy agents because doing so can cause them 
to feel guilty, which is precisely what they deserve to feel.  
 I’ll return to the practicality requirement in the next section, but it will be helpful to 
highlight one additional feature of Carlsson’s account before proceeding. According to 
Carlsson, guilt, resentment, and indignation all share (some of) the same evaluative content. 
Feeling guilty involves having the thought that I’ve displayed an objectionable quality of will, 
while feeling resentment and indignation involves the thought that someone else has displayed 
an objectionable quality of will. Thus, on Carlsson’s account, guilt, resentment, and indignation 
all entail one another. If it’s appropriate for one agent to feel guilty, then absent certain 
overriding considerations, it will also be appropriate for other agents to feel resentment and/or 
indignation towards her.  
 By focusing on the nature of guilt, Carlsson has provided an account of 
blameworthiness—DG—that can meet the practicality requirement and overcome the problem 
of contingent harm. In addition, the view nicely dovetails with communicative approaches to 
blame and presents a compelling picture of the relationship between guilt, resentment, and 
indignation.  
4. The guilt-free and the guilt-ridden 
Recall Carlsson’s description of the practicality requirement: “If we know that an agent is 
blameworthy, we should also know that it is pro tanto permissible to express blame” (Carlsson 
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2017: 95). But one might wonder why accounts of blameworthiness must be beholden to our 
blaming practices. Why should accounts of blameworthiness provide grounds on which 
expressions of blame can be understood as deserved or fair in order to be successful? For 
Carlsson, the practicality requirement is an important theoretical desideratum for accounts of 
blameworthiness because we care about blameworthiness, in part, because we care about our 
blaming practices. He argues: “If an account of blameworthiness does not give us any way of 
understanding whether our blaming practices are justified, it fails to answer the question that 
gives the debate about blameworthiness its moral urgency” (Carlsson 2017: 95). Because 
Carlsson develops his guilt-based account of blameworthiness in part to justify our blaming 
practices, it will be worthwhile to examine the practices that surround guilt. I’m particularly 
interested in the conversations that surround guilt-free and guilt-ridden confessions of 
wrongdoing. These cases are illuminating because though the work of allocating deserved 
suffering is, depending on the case, either already accomplished or futile, our blaming practices 
are far from over.     
Imagine the following case. Blanche and Dorothy are good friends, and one weekend 
they agree to go camping together. The day of their trip, Blanche calls Dorothy to say that she’s 
running late and promises to meet her at the campsite with a tent and other camping supplies 
that evening. The campsite is at the end of a fairly arduous hike up a mountain and there is no 
cell reception in the area. Dorothy does the hike herself and waits for Blanche, but she never 
comes. By the time Dorothy realizes Blanche isn’t coming, it’s too dark to hike down the 
mountain, so she’s forced to camp alone without any supplies. Dorothy spends a sleepless night 
worrying about Blanche and trying to stay warm. The next morning, Dorothy hikes down the 
mountain checking for signs of Blanche along the way. When she gets back to her car, she 
finally gets cell reception and receives a text from Blanche. In the text, Blanche confesses to 
simply not feeling like going camping that day, so she decided to stay home.  
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Though Blanche admits that what she did was wrong, she doesn’t feel guilty about 
breaking her promise to Dorothy and putting her in a dangerous situation. And, though Blanche 
is a normal agent in many respects, expressed resentment, at least in this instance, does nothing 
to make her feel guilty. And while Dorothy knows all this, she nevertheless blames Blanche 
for what she’s done and expresses resentment towards her. Given that Blanche is guilt-free and 
will remain so in the face of being blamed, it’s difficult to see how DG could provide grounds 
on which to understand Dorothy’s blame of Blanche as permissible.   
Carlsson argues that, if DG is true, we have pro tanto reason to blame blameworthy 
agents because blame has the ability to generate guilt, and thus bring about a noninstrumentally 
good state of affairs (2017: 108). It is in virtue of DG’s ability to generate these pro tanto 
reasons to express blame towards blameworthy agents that the view is able to meet the 
practicality requirement. But Blanche will not experience any amount of guilt due to Dorothy’s 
resentment. Thus, on DG, Dorothy doesn’t seem to have a pro tanto reason to blame Blanche. 
But if DG cannot provide Dorothy with a pro tanto reason to blame Blanche, then it’s unclear 
how the view can provide an understanding of Dorothy’s blame as permissible. And, if DG 
cannot provide an understanding of Dorothy’s blame as permissible, then the view fails to meet 
the practicality requirement.  
There are a variety of ways a defender of DG might respond to the above argument. 
First, one might argue that, given the particulars of the case, Dorothy need not have a pro tanto 
reason to blame Blanche in order for her blame to be permissible. Because Blanche cannot 
experience guilt when Dorothy resents her, she wouldn’t suffer if Dorothy were to blame her. 
And perhaps agents need not have a pro tanto reason to permissibly engage in practices that 
don’t harm their targets. Alternatively, one could argue that Dorothy shouldn’t blame Blanche, 
and thus DG isn’t at a disadvantage for being unable to provide an understanding of Dorothy’s 
blame as permissible. Blanche’s psychology is admittedly odd. One might argue that an 
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individual who cannot feel guilt when resented in a particular situation is agentially 
compromised, and is thus not an appropriate target of our reactive attitudes. For example, 
Strawson questions whether an agent who experiences one reactive attitude but not the others 
is even conceptually possible and deems such agents to be moral solipsists (1962).7 If agents 
incapable of experiencing guilt aren’t moral agents, then perhaps it’s inappropriate for Dorothy 
to blame Blanche, even if doing so doesn’t harm her at all.  
While our reactions to the confessions of guilt-free agents may not require justification, 
and may in fact be morally suspect, the same cannot be said for our reactions to the confessions 
of guilt-ridden agents. Here is one illustrative case from the television show Please Like Me. 
In one episode, one of the characters Tom, guiltily confesses to his partner Ella that he may 
have given her an STI and that he lied about getting a sexual health test before they got together. 
Imagine that Tom, upon confessing to Ella, feels the appropriate degree of guilt for what he’s 
done—he suffers to the precise degree that he deserves to suffer to.8 Imagine further that if Ella 
were to express resentment towards him, he would experience undeserved suffering.9 Let’s 
 
7 Nicholas Sars (2019) has recently presented an interpretation of Strawson on which the inability to 
experience guilt amounts to an exempting condition. Philosophers disagree on this point, however. For 
example, Gilbert Harman (2009) argues that guilt is not essential to morality and that there are morally 
excellent (and presumably praiseworthy) agents who do not experience guilt.  
8 One might resist the claim that it’s possible for someone like Tom to experience the deserved amount 
of suffering prior to being blamed by others. Perhaps what Tom deserves is to suffer in virtue of being 
blamed by Ella. While this view may appeal to some, the guilt-centric theorists cannot adopt it without 
modifying their commitments. According to Carlsson, blameworthy agents deserve to suffer in virtue 
of “acknowledging [their] own objectional quality of will” (2017: 104) and Clarke argues that 
blameworthy agents deserve to feel guilty “because of their culpability” (2016: 122). Thus, on the guilt-
centric approach to blameworthiness, it’s possible to get precisely what one deserves without ever 
having been blamed by others. And while I’ll defend the view that Ella is in fact justified in expressing 
blame towards Tom, I don’t think this is because Tom can only experience the requisite amount of 
suffering if he’s blamed by Ella. Rather, I’ll argue that expressing blame towards blameworthy agents 
can be justified on grounds that are distinct from the allocation of deserved suffering. Thanks to Julia 
Annas for discussion on this point.  
9 One could argue that if an agent truly feels exactly as guilty as they deserve to feel, then no amount 
of resentment will cause them to suffer more than they deserve to suffer. Of course, it’s possible that 
being the target of resentment will not cause a guilt-ridden agent to feel guiltier than they deserve to 
feel, but it’s unlikely that being the target of resentment will never have such an effect. It is not 
uncommon for agents to feel guiltier than they deserve to feel for wrongs they’ve committed or to 
experience recalcitrant guilt for acts they take to not be wrong at all. So, it shouldn’t be too surprising 
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also assume Ella strongly suspects that any expression of resentment on her part would cause 
him to suffer unduly, but she blames him nonetheless. Can DG give us a way of understanding 
Ella’s blame of Tom as justified? 
 DG can provide pro tanto reasons for Ella to blame Tom. Tom is blameworthy, after 
all, and deserves to feel guilty. This alone gives Ella, and perhaps any other bystander, pro 
tanto reason to express resentment or indignation towards Tom. But it’s not clear that DG can 
provide grounds on which Ella’s expression of resentment towards Tom would be justified. 
This is important, however, because the very motivation for the practicality requirement is that 
we want our theories of blameworthiness to provide a framework in which we can understand 
our blaming practices as justified. And if a theory cannot do this, then, according to Carlsson, 
“…it fails to answer the question that gives the debate about blameworthiness its moral 
urgency” (Carlsson 2017: 95). 
In fact, on Carlsson’s desert-based approach to the practicality requirement, DG will 
provide reasons not to blame Tom. Because Tom feels the exact amount of guilt that he 
deserves to feel, any expression of resentment on Ella’s part (or anyone else’s) would cause 
Tom to suffer more than he deserves. To experience more suffering than one deserves is 
noninstrumentally bad, and thus provides people with pro tanto reason to not bring about this 
state of affairs.  
But shouldn’t Ella resent Tom? And not just feel resentment, but express her resentment 
towards him? It is common practice to respond to guilty confessions with resentment, even if 
we know, perhaps with certainty, that the target of our resentment feels guilty enough as it is. 
This is particularly true when we first learn that someone has regarded us with ill will or treated 
 
that resentment can generate increases in guilt even in already guilt-ridden agents. In fact, empirical 
work suggests that expressions of blame can generate guilt in agents even if they explicitly don’t blame 
themselves for the relevant action (Parkinson & Illingworth 2009). Thanks to Matt King and David 
Shoemaker for raising this objection.  
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us in a blameworthy fashion through that agent’s guilty confession. But DG cannot give us a 
way of understanding this blaming practice as justified.  
Interestingly, other views of blame fail to ground the practice of blaming those who 
guiltily confess to wrongdoing. For example, the communicative views that connect so nicely 
with Carlsson’s account will struggle to make sense of expressions of resentment towards guilt-
ridden agents. On these accounts, the point of blame is to get blameworthy agents to feel the 
appropriate degree of remorse and guilt, but these tasks are accomplished prior to any 
expression of blame in cases like Tom and Ella’s.10 Those who understand blame as a kind of 
protest (e.g., Hieronymi 2001; Smith 2013; McGeer 2013) will also be hard pressed to justify 
expressions of resentment towards guilt-ridden wrongdoers. Take Hieronymi’s (2001) account 
of resentment as protest of past actions that persist as threats. Hieronymi understands past 
actions to persist as threats under the following conditions: 
I suggest that a past wrong against you, standing in your history without apology, 
atonement, retribution, punishment, restitution, condemnation, or anything else 
that might recognize it as a wrong, makes a claim. It says, in effect, that you can 
be treated this way, and that such treatment is acceptable. That—that claim—is 
what you resent. It poses a threat. (2001: 546) 
 
But in cases of guilty confessions, it’s not clear that wrongs persist as threats. The guilty party 
clearly recognizes what they’ve done as a wrong and have suffered in light of this recognition. 
And if the wrong doesn’t persist to be a threat, on what grounds can the wronged party 
experience or express resentment? 
At this juncture, readers might wonder whether accounts of blameworthiness should 
strive to justify the practice of blaming guilt-ridden agents. If the target of resentment has 
suffered enough in virtue of experiencing the appropriate degree of guilt, and if the wrong 
they’ve committed is no longer a threat, even if we typically do continue to resent them, ought 
 
10 I develop this critique of communicative accounts of blame, with particular attention to Fricker’s 
(2016; forthcoming) view, in “Expanding Moral Understanding” (forthcoming).  
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we? Perhaps this is a practice that should be done away with. If so, then DG is no longer at a 
disadvantage for being unable to justify our expressions of resentment and indignation towards 
guilt-ridden agents. Rather, the view is in the position to be able to diagnose what’s gone wrong 
with a morally objectionable practice.  
But if we reflect on how people go about blaming those who have guiltily confessed, 
it’s not clear that the point of blame in these cases is to inflict more suffering onto the target of 
resentment or to get them to feel guiltier than they already do. For example, here’s how Ella 
responds to Tom’s guilty confession on Please Like Me. She exclaims:  
Oh. Dammit! Now I have to get angry at you, and I don't want to, but I have to as 
a way of respecting myself. The frustrating thing is, I don't know what to say 
because I can tell that you already know how bad what you did was. Did you get 
symptoms? Did it hurt? Were you really scared? Ok, good. Well, if you're in pain 
and fear, I don't have to be as angry at you. I'm not going to break up with you, but 
I need to make sure that you know that doesn't mean that I don't value myself. I 
value myself, ok?  
 
Here, Ella doesn’t want to make Tom feel worse than he does (though she does think it’s 
important that he in fact feels bad). Nevertheless, she thinks it’s important that she expresses 
anger towards him. This is because Ella takes her expression of anger to be intimately tied to 
self-respect and valuing herself. I submit that this is why it’s justified to express blame towards 
those who’ve wronged us, even if they feel adequately guilty.  
5. Blame and respect 
The relationship between blame and respect has not been overlooked by philosophers, 
particularly the connection between resentment and respect. Many have argued that possessing 
self-respect disposes agents to resent those who wrong them. For example, Robin Dillon writes:  
Those who understand themselves to be morally entitled as persons to certain 
treatment are disposed to resent what they regard as indignities; thus, in a morally 
imperfect world, the liability to resentment is an integral feature of recognition self-
respect. (1997: 230)  
 
And Jeffrie Murphy makes an even stronger claim, arguing: “A person who never resented any 
injuries done to him might be a saint. It is equally likely, however, that his lack of resentment 
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reveals a servile personality—a personality lacking in respect for himself…” (Murphy 2005: 
19).11 Others, like Samuel Reis-Dennis (2019), argue that expressions of resentment can foster 
self-respect, while Myisha Cherry (2019) contends that resentment can express respect for 
wrongdoers.  
But what do these theorists take respect to be? Some, like Murphy, take respect to 
simply involve caring about others, and oneself, in a distinctively moral way. He argues: “Just 
as indignation and guilt over the mistreatment of others stands as emotional testimony that we 
care about them and their rights, so does resentment stand as emotional testimony that we care 
about ourselves and our rights” (Murphy 2005: 19). On this view, expressions of resentment, 
indignation, and guilt can communicate that one possesses respect for the victim. That is, 
roughly, that one takes the victim to:  
(1) be the kind of agent who ought not be shown ill will, or who should not be 
treated in a way that is blameworthy, or whose legitimate demands should be 
respected by others. And,  
 
(2) deserve moral attention, care, or concern in light of being shown ill will, or 
being treated in a way that is blameworthy, or having her legitimate demands 
being disrespected. 12 
 
 
11 Even Margaret Urban Walker, who is sceptical of Murphy’s claim that only agents who possess self-
respect can resent others (2006: 122), takes resentment to express a demand for moral attention from 
its targets. She argues: “…resentment both expresses a sense of wrong and calls out to others for 
recognition and a reparative response” (2006: 136). And, R. Jay Wallace, though he doesn’t take blame 
to be importantly connected to respect, argues that expressions of resentment “…call out for distinctive 
responses on the part of the wrongdoer, generating directed obligations of acknowledgement, apology, 
and repair that potentially culminate in the bestowal of forgiveness (2019: 94).  
12 One might argue that these thoughts do not capture the complex nature of respect that many 
philosophers are interested in. Dillon, for example, operates with Stephen Darwall’s (1977) concept of 
recognition self-respect, which involves “recognising and valuing oneself as a being with dignity, 
appreciating the moral constraints to which the dignity of persons give rise, and living in light of this 
normative self-understanding” (1997: 229). In this essay, I’ll work with this pared down conception of 
respect, since more robust notions will likely fail to meet what Gideon Rosen calls the naivety constraint 
(2015: 75). Since these respect-based thoughts are supposed to accompany experiences of resentment 
and indignation, it’s important to isolate thoughts about respect that children, and other groups with 
developmental difficulties who are capable of experiencing resentment, can have. And while children 
will likely be unfamiliar with the concept of dignity and what it means to be a person, they are well 
acquainted with the concepts of fairness and desert (Portmore 2019: 13) as well as attention and 
concern.  
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 Like Carlsson, I won’t take a firm stance on the precise content of the thoughts that 
expressions of these reactive attitudes can communicate. The first thought is meant simply to 
be a corollary of the constitutive thoughts of these reactive attitudes as defended by Carlsson 
(2017), Clarke (2016), and Portmore (2019). As for the second thought, given the variability 
of our moral experience and the sheer number of ways in which agents can treat one another 
poorly, it would be a mistake to argue that these thoughts target any particular action or 
behaviour. For my purposes here, it will only be important to highlight that this thought 
involves desert and distinctively moral treatment as essential features. 
 Philosophers are not alone in noting the relationship between resentment and respect. 
This respect-based function of blame is nicely reflected in the empirical literature on anger and 
resentment. For example, Brian Parkinson characterises the communicative agenda of anger to 
be to “take me seriously and give me the respect I deserve!” (Parkinson 1996: 677).  And, many 
take the characteristically threatening actions associated with anger to function as a way of 
changing the wrongdoer’s treatment of the victim, both by signalling an intolerance towards 
mistreatment (Haidt 2003) and indicating that negative consequences will follow if the 
wrongdoer doesn’t correct their behaviour (Keltner et al. 2006; Fischer & Rosman 2007; 
Fischer & Manstead 2008).  
While this respect-based function of blame has both philosophical and empirical 
support, guilt-centric theorists are unable to capture it on their views. These theorists focus on 
only one function of blame: its ability, in the form of expressed resentment and indignation, to 
generate suffering in those who are blameworthy. But blame’s ability to communicate respect 
is also a morally important function and it can justify expressions of resentment towards guilt-
ridden agents.13 Let’s return to the Ella and Tom case. Once Tom guiltily confesses to lying to 
 
13 In arguing that expressions of blame can communicate respect for victims, I do not argue that 
expressions of blame must always communicate this message. It may be possible to resent or be 
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Ella and putting her at risk for contracting an illness, Ella knows that Tom feels guilty, and 
indeed exactly as guilty as he deserves to feel for wronging her. She also strongly suspects that 
any degree of resentment she expresses will make Tom feel guiltier than he deserves to feel. 
How ought Ella respond to Tom? I think Ella is justified in expressing at least mild resentment 
towards Tom upon hearing his confession. This is because in doing so, she communicates that 
she respects herself—that she takes herself to be someone who deserves better treatment than 
she was given by Tom and that she is owed something in virtue of this treatment. Imagine that 
Ella doesn’t respond with resentment in light of Tom’s confession. Imagine that she simply 
asks a few questions to confirm he’s felt the requisite amount of suffering that he deserves to 
feel, and once satisfied that he has, she leaves the matter alone. I think something would have 
gone wrong in this scenario. Something of moral importance would have failed to be 
communicated—namely that Ella won’t stand for this kind of treatment and what it is, 
precisely, that she takes herself to be owed in virtue of this treatment. While Tom’s guilty 
confession can communicate to Ella, and the moral community, that he cares about Ella, this 
is a very different message than one that communicates to the moral community that Ella cares 
about herself. And, even if Tom knows that he owes something to Ella in light of wronging 
her, what precisely he owes will depend at least partially on what she takes to be appropriate. 
But if Ella doesn’t express resentment towards Tom, both of these messages go 
uncommunicated.  
One might argue that even though expressions of resentment have the ability to 
communicate self-respect, this does not justify these expressions because messages of self-
respect can be communicated in less morally fraught ways. For example, one could simply say: 
 
indignant towards someone without having the thought that they owe anything to anyone. Perhaps their 
wrong was victimless, for example. Thanks to Brian Hedden and Doug Portmore for independently 
raising the possibility of such cases.   
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“I am an agent who ought not be treated with ill will and I deserve moral attention in light of 
what you’ve done” to those that have wronged them. But just as expressions of resentment 
aren’t guaranteed to generate guilt in their targets, calm statements of fact can’t be guaranteed 
to not generate guilt and suffering. Agents’ psychologies vary and some individuals might be 
more likely to experience guilt (or to experience a greater degree of guilt) upon hearing such 
statements than expressions of resentment. Furthermore, it’s not clear that non-affective forms 
of communication are as effective at signalling self-respect as expressions of resentment. 
Philosophers and psychologists have long noted that emotions are particularly effective forms 
of communication (e.g. McGeer 2013) and resentment, in particular, is adept at communicating 
messages of respect and altering the behaviour of wrongdoers towards their victims (Parkinson 
1996; Fischer & Rosman 2007; Fischer & Manstead 2008). In fact, Shaun Nichols argues that 
even other emotions, like moral sadness, cannot do the work of moral anger (2007: 420).   
And, in the case of Ella and Tom, it is morally important that Ella successfully 
communicates this message of self-respect. To see this, we can reflect on Joel Feinberg’s 
(1970) discussion of propositionally claiming rights.14 To propositionally claim that one 
possesses particular rights is to assert that one has them and to do so in a way that insists that 
others recognise them as well (Feinberg 1970: 251). To claim that one has rights is not simply 
to calmly inform others about a state of affairs, but rather to assert these rights in a way to 
“make sure people listen” (Feinberg 1970: 252, emphasis in original). And while not all 
circumstances require us to make such claims, there are some circumstances in which it is very 
important that we do. Feinberg argues:  
To claim that something is the case in circumstances that justify no more than calm 
assertion is to behave like a boor…But not to claim in the appropriate 
circumstances that one has a right is to be spiritless or foolish. A list of ‘appropriate 
circumstances’ would include occasions when one is challenged, when one’s 
 
14 I’d like to thank an anonymous Reader for drawing my attention Feinberg’s discussion of 
propositional claiming.  
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possession is denied, or seems insufficiently acknowledged or appreciated…” 
(1970: 252).   
 
Likewise, upon hearing Tom’s guilty confession, Ella finds herself in a situation that calls for 
her to communicate a message of self-respect and to do so in a way that makes sure others pay 
attention. By expressing resentment towards Tom, not only does she communicate this message 
of self-respect but she does so in a way that helps ensure that others, particularly Tom, take her 
seriously. To fail to blame Tom or to simply and unemotionally inform Tom that she is owed 
moral attention in virtue of his blameworthy behaviour would run the risk of rending Ella 
“spiritless or foolish” and generates a not insignificant amount of non-instrumental badness in 
the world.15 Indeed, in the case of Ella and Tom, I suspect the amount of disvalue generated by 
Ella not expressing her resentment towards Tom after his guilty confession is greater than the 
amount of disvalue generated by Tom suffering a moderate amount of undeserved guilt.16  
Of course, highlighting this respect-based function of blame doesn’t justify expressing 
resentment and indignation at wrongdoers in any and all circumstances. We can imagine 
versions of the Tom and Ella case, for example, where the good generated by Ella’s expression 
of resentment would be far outweighed by the undeserved suffering that Tom would endure 
due to the experience of undeserved guilt. Perhaps Tom, Ella, and the relevant members of the 
 
15 This is why even if resentment cannot generate undeserved suffering in already guilt-ridden agents, 
as discussed in footnote 9, DG will still be less promising than a view that can capture the moral badness 
of Ella not blaming Tom. At best, Ella’s resentment of Tom will be redundant on DG. But, as argued 
above, Ella’s resentment of Tom is morally valuable. Indeed, that is why Ella is justified in resenting 
Tom, but DG cannot capture this justification of blaming guilt-ridden wrongdoers.  
16 We can say something similar about the Dorothy and Blanche case (if we take Blanche to be the kind 
of agent who can be the appropriate target of our reactive attitudes). Once Dorothy realizes that Blanche 
does not, and will never, feel guilty for wronging Dorothy, how should Dorothy react? Again, I think 
the appropriate reaction would be for Dorothy to express her resentment towards Blanche. And what 
justifies this expression of resentment is that it is able to communicate to Blanche that Dorothy respects 
herself. Now, one might think that Blanche, if she’s incapable of experiencing guilt about breaking her 
promise to Dorothy, won’t be able to take up the message of Dorothy’s resentment—namely that 
Dorothy respects herself. However, it seems possible that an individual can fail to experience guilt but 
still be able to comprehend that someone they’ve wronged takes themselves to have self-respect. And, 
importantly, even if Blanche isn’t capable of understanding that Dorothy takes herself to have self-
respect, this message can be communicated to other members of the moral community via Dorothy 
blaming Blanche.  
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moral community know full-well that Ella respects herself and what, precisely, is owed to her 
in virtue of being wronged. In such a case, Ella communicating a message of self-respect 
through resentment might be largely redundant, and the moral value of such an act may not 
outweigh the undeserved suffering it causes Tom. In this paper, the goal is to offer a framework 
in which we can understand blaming the guilt-ridden as justified, not to justify every instance 
of this practice.  
 So far, I’ve argued that blame can communicate respect to victims, which is a morally 
important function and one that can justify resenting already adequately guilty wrongdoers. 
But can this respect-based function of blame also justify expressions of guilt as well? I think it 
can. In fact, by reflecting on the relationship between guilt and respect, we can identify an 
interesting feature of guilt that has been overlooked by recent guilt-centric theorists. In addition 
to its evaluative and affective content, guilt is also characterized by a particular action 
tendency. When we feel guilty for wronging someone, we often feel the desire to express our 
guilt, by way of confession, to those we’ve wronged and attempt to repair the relationship 
(Baumeister et al. 1994; Haidt 2003; Lazarus 1991; Nichols 2007). Patricia Greenspan, in her 
book Practical Guilt, calls this action tendency the “reparative urge” (1995: 130), and argues 
that it distinguishes guilt from other self-censoring emotions like shame. Why do we often feel 
the desire to express our guilt, by way of confession, to those we’ve wronged, and attempt to 
repair our relationship with them? According to psychologists, guilt stimulates confession 
because “Interpersonally, confession is a means of acknowledging one’s debt to another 
person, and, one hopes, accepting the necessity of repairing any damage to the relationship” 
(Baumeister et al.: 1994: 257). When we feel guilty, we don’t just have self-directed thoughts 
about the blameworthiness of our behaviour or the quality of our wills. We also have thoughts 
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about the victims of our behaviour and what they deserve in virtue of being wronged by us.17 
And, by expressing our guilt through confession, we can communicate that we take our victims 
to be deserving of respect, despite our previous actions, which can begin the reparative process.  
Guilty confessions play an important role in our blaming practices. Yet, this feature of 
guilt has been ignored by recent guilt-centric theorists like Carlsson, Clarke, and Portmore. 
Though views like DG nicely capture the constitutive evaluative and affective components of 
guilt, it does not do the same for guilt’s reparative action tendency. DG analyses 
blameworthiness solely in terms of what blameworthy agents deserve and remains silent on 
what blameworthy agents ought to do in virtue of being blameworthy. The only situation in 
which guiltily confessing could be justified by DG is if the wrongdoer doesn’t feel the deserved 
amount of suffering for his wrongdoing and confessing will cause him to do so. But think of 
Tom. Tom experiences the requisite amount of guilt for wronging Ella but most would agree 
that Tom should confess to Ella because he is blameworthy. Why? Because blameworthy 
agents don’t simply deserve to suffer, they also owe something to their victims. And guilt, and 
the expression of it, can do many things beyond allocating deserved suffering. Expressing guilt 
can communicate to the victim that the wrongdoer cares about them, and their moral status, 
despite their previous actions, and sets the stage for repairing the relationship.  
Like expressions of resentment and indignation, guiltily confessing won’t be justified 
in every situation. Sometimes a guilty confession does more harm to the victim than remaining 
silent would, and sometimes confessing guilt assuages the wrongdoer of their suffering before 
 
17 Because of these victim-directed thoughts that accompany guilt, I would resist the characterization 
of guilt as a purely self-regarding emotion (pace Macnamara 2015: footnote 1). Though many conceive 
of guilt as a self-directed reactive attitude, some philosophers have noted the important role guilt plays 
in third-party interactions. For example, McKenna, who places primacy on expressions of the reactive 
attitudes in his conversational theory of moral responsibility, argues that fundamental cases of guilt 
feature agents not simply suffering in light of what they’ve done, but also engaging in a range of 
behaviours to restore their relationships and change their attitudes and intentions towards others 
(McKenna 2012: 73).  
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they deserve to feel better. Again, the goal here is not to offer a justification of every guilty 
confession but simply to highlight the grounds on which one could justify this practice. 
Recognizing the various considerations for and against these blaming practices can make it 
difficult to know when engaging in these practices is justified and when it is not. But this is a 
difficult matter. We’re constantly struggling to determine whether we should confess when we 
think we’ve done something wrong, whether we should stand up for ourselves when we think 
that we’ve been wronged, and whether we should simply let things go. This complexity is 
something philosophers should strive to capture in our theories.  
6. What does respect have to do with blameworthiness?  
Carlsson might be prepared to grant the entirety of the argumentation above but continue to 
defend the claim that to be blameworthy is still best conceived of in terms of deserved guilt.  
After all, Carlsson never argues that blame only serves the function of causing agents to suffer 
by experiencing guilt. In fact, he explicitly acknowledges that blame can “influence people, 
express our moral standing, or uphold a moral standard that has been breached” (Carlsson 
2017: 109).18 Perhaps he would be happy to accept that blame can communicate respect as 
well. But, according to Carlsson, these ways of justifying blame do not satisfy the practicality 
requirement because they have nothing to do with the blameworthiness of agents. He argues:  
We may have reasons to influence people, confirm our moral standing, and so on, 
even if the wrongdoer was not blameworthy for his action. The justification that I 
have proposed differs in this respect. I have argued that it is fair to express the 
reactive attitudes because the agent is blameworthy. (Carlsson 2017: 109) 
 
 So, Carlsson could argue, even though DG cannot provide reasons to engage in our blaming 
practices in order to accomplish the function of communicating respect, this does not affect the 
view’s ability to meet the practicality requirement.  
 
18 Likewise, the communicative theorists whose work dovetails with Carlsson’s also acknowledge that 
the reactive attitudes can perform many functions (Macnamara 2015: 562) and that there is more than 
one kind of blame (Fricker 2016: 166–167). 
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However, blame’s ability to communicate respect clearly is related to an agent’s 
blameworthiness. When Ella expresses resentment towards Tom, in addition to causing him 
undeserved suffering, she also communicates that she takes herself (1) to be the kind of agent 
who ought not be shown ill will, or who should not be treated in a way that is blameworthy, or 
whose legitimate demands should be respected by others, and (2) to deserve moral attention 
(or care or concern) in virtue of being wronged by Tom. Ella is justified in communicating this 
message of self-respect, in part, because Tom is blameworthy. If Tom weren’t blameworthy 
for lying to Ella, then (2) wouldn’t be true.19 Ella wouldn’t deserve moral attention or care or 
concern in virtue of Tom’s blameworthy treatment of her, and there would be no value in Ella 
communicating this message. Thus, Tom’s being blameworthy, in part, justifies Ella 
communicating this message of self-respect by expressing her resentment.  
Guilt-centric theorists like Carlsson are preoccupied with what blameworthy agents 
deserve. But being blameworthy may very well involve much more than deserving to suffer in 
light of one’s culpability. We often talk about blameworthy agents as owing something to their 
victims, be it an apology, an act of atonement, or simply an acknowledgment of wrongdoing. 
As R. Jay Wallace recently observed: “It is customary to think that the person who transgresses 
against moral requirements is under a duty not only to acknowledge wrongdoing and to offer 
an apology, but also to do what is possible to make amends” (2019: 92). So, perhaps being 
blameworthy involves owing moral attention, care, or concern to those one has wronged.20  
 
19 One might resist the claim that (2) can only be true in the case of Ella and Tom if Tom is in fact 
blameworthy. If Tom had an excuse or exemption for treating Ella the way he did, he would still owe 
her moral attention, care, or concern in light of harming her even if he is not blameworthy for doing so. 
But notice that (2) still wouldn’t be true in such a case. Ella may be owed moral attention, care, or 
concern but not in light of being shown ill will, or being treated in a way that is blameworthy, or having 
her legitimate demands being disrespected. (2) isn’t a thought about what we are owed generally by 
other agents, it’s a thought about what we are owed when we are disrespected (i.e. shown ill will, treated 
in a blameworthy manner, had one’s legitimate demands violated). Thanks to Andreas Carlsson for 
discussion on this point.  
20 Notice that this can be true even if we owe care/attention/concern to others when we are not 
blameworthy. Take the following analogy: When I give a gift to someone on their birthday, I am 
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And it is this fact that grounds many of our blaming practices, including expressions of 
resentment towards guilt-ridden agents as well as these guilt-ridden agents’ confessions. These 
practices aren’t at all concerned with allocating deserved suffering to blameworthy agents, but 
they are concerned with allocating moral attention, care, or concern to victims. But because the 
guilt-centric theorists are interested only in the justification of blaming practices that generate 
suffering in blameworthy agents, they cannot account for the many blaming practices that aim 
to provide victims, and not perpetrators, with what they are owed. If we want our accounts of 
blameworthiness to capture our blaming practices,21 then we should reject guilt-centric 
accounts like DG because, as Carlsson argues, they fail “to answer the question that gives the 
debate about blameworthiness its moral urgency” (Carlsson 2017: 95).  
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justified in doing so because it’s their birthday. The fact that there are many reasons and justifications 
to give gifts to others does not change this. Similarly, we may owe attention/care/concern to others for 
many reasons, but this doesn’t change the fact that I can also owe these things in virtue of being 
blameworthy.  
21 One might argue that our account of blameworthiness shouldn’t be beholden to our blaming practices 
at all. Perhaps questions about blameworthiness are just different in kind from questions about the 
justification of expressions of resentment and indignation. Hieronymi, for example, has argued that 
blaming actions, like expressions of resentment and indignation, have a different characteristic force 
than that of blame, which derives its force from our judgments, and thus the two are governed by distinct 
fairness conditions (2001: 118). But if our theories of blameworthiness operate independently from our 
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